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Introduction 
The most recent Summit of the Americas, held in Argentina in November 2005, bringing together 
the leaders of the Western Hemisphere, provided the latest opportunity for President Hugo 
Chavez's efforts to put forward an alternative project for Latin America. Upsetting the agenda of 
the Summit, Chavez was successful in transforming the event into a referendum on the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As he has long argued, Chavez denounced the FTAA as an 
effort by the wealthier states in the hemisphere to exploit the poor, and he has instead proposed 
ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas) as a pact that would exclude the United States.  
By the end of the event, only Venezuela and the four members of Mercosur, an alternative 
regional integration effort, opposed the proposed summit communiqué and the FTAA. However, 
Chavez played skillfully to the numerous Latin American journalists in attendance and the masses 
of anti-Bush demonstrators that had gathered near the Summit venue.[2] Sentiments among the 
leaders after the Summit ran high, with a public rebuke by Mexico's President Fox leading to a 
verbal counterpunch by Hugo Chavez and a mutual withdrawal of ambassadors between Mexico 
and Venezuela.  
The acrimony of this Summit contrasts strongly with the consensual atmosphere of previous 
regional summits and highlights a growing division in the Americas. In 1998, President Hugo 
Chavez became one of the first Latin American leaders elected in what has become an 
increasingly clear trend towards left wing or progressive governments in the region. Unlike many 
of those that have followed, Hugo Chavez is not the product of democratic party politics but rather 
a former military officer and coup leader whose attachment to the rules of democratic game is 
shaky at best. In fact, the Chavez administration represents an outlier among the recent wave of 
elected leaders in Latin America—leaders such as Presidents Luis Ignacio da Silva of Brazil and 
Nestor Kirchner of Argentina who by and large are firmly committed to democracy and the rule of 
law.  
Within Venezuela, Hugo Chavez has led a veritable transformation of the democratic system that 
had been in place since 1958 by introducing a new constitution, a new legislative assembly and 
supreme court, and a new electoral oversight mechanism. Despite considerable domestic 
opposition and an attempted coup in 2002, President Chavez has consolidated complete control 
within Venezuela, as highlighted by his overwhelming victory in the 2005 municipal and legislative 
elections. Chavez's clear commitment to a populist agenda, 'Bolivarian' participative democracy, 
and most recently, '21st century socialism', sets him apart within Latin America, but also contrasts 
strongly with many of Venezuela's previous policies, with had largely been designed to favor 
representative democracy and the status quo.  
Radical change in Venezuela has produced a transformation in its foreign policy. President 
Chávez has reinvigorated OPEC, which had seemed moribund during the 1990s, and he has 
sought to build direct ties to other non-OPEC oil producers, such as Russia, and new markets, 
such as China. Venezuela has increasingly projected its ambivalence over its role as a key 
supplier of oil to the United States, both reaffirming its view of the importance of the U.S. market 
and threatening to deny access to oil as a strategic lever against U.S. policies. Where it had once 
been a major supporter of representative democracy in the hemisphere, increasingly, Venezuela 
has been advocating an alternative vision of participatory democracy that emphasizes mass 
mobilization and downgrades the role of institutions. It views continuing U.S. support for 
representative democracy in Latin America as thinly disguised meddling in the hemisphere, yet it 
is all too willing to use its oil wealth to support like-minded political leaders and elements of civil 
society in Latin America, Europe and the United States. At its core, Venezuela's current foreign 
policy views the United States as the main threat to the promotion of its agenda internationally 
and the defense of the revolution at home.  
To what extent does Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy represent a historic break with the past? 
How important is this shift? Does it represent a threat to U.S. interests? In some ways, there are 
significant continuities in Venezuela's contemporary foreign policy when it comes to oil, but there 
has been a substantial shift when it comes to democracy. What is new about President Chávez's 
Bolivarian foreign policy is that it has moved beyond Venezuela's traditional efforts to maintain 
strategic independence and maximize oil revenue to one of explicitly seeking out allies in a bid to 
check U.S. power and influence in Latin America. From the perspective of U.S. policy makers, 
this goal may seem unfeasible for a country with the limited power and resources of Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, this is the main axis of Bolivarian foreign policy today. 
The Strategic Importance of Venezuela  
Venezuela has often sought to play an outsized role in hemispheric politics, particularly 
considering its relatively limited size and capabilities. Although it enjoyed a brief moment in the 
sun during the Latin American wars of independence, the strategic importance of Venezuela only 
truly emerged after the discovery of major oil deposits there in 1914. Since World War II, 
Venezuela has parlayed its role as a leading oil supplier to world markets into a diplomatic voice 
in pursuit of its national interests. During the democratic period of 1958-1998, this meant that 
Venezuela often used its influence and power to promote democracy within the hemisphere, yet 
on a world stage, what mattered was protecting its share of the world market for petroleum 
products and sustaining high prices for the same. 
Beginning in the 1920s, U.S., British and Dutch companies created the physical infrastructure for 
Venezuela to become the largest oil exporter in the Western Hemisphere. They also played a key 
role in shaping Venezuelan oil legislation and even the role this natural resource would play its 
politics. The strategic importance of Venezuela's oil to the United States. was confirmed during 
World War II, and was reconfirmed time and again during each recurring Middle East political or 
military crisis of the Cold War and beyond.  
After World War II, Venezuelan democratic governments sought greater access to a share of oil 
profits, initially through higher royalties and taxes, but eventually shifting towards gaining state 
control of the industry itself. Venezuela also sought to promote its views regarding the importance 
of national control of oil production in developing countries through its leading role in the creation 
of OPEC.[3] Even though it was a leader in OPEC, Venezuela developed a reputation as a 
reliable supplier of oil to U.S. markets, particularly in moments of international crisis. There was 
considerable friction until the 1973 oil crisis over U.S. oil import quotas that were 
disadvantageous to Venezuela. One historic missed opportunity, at least from the Venezuelan 
perspective, was that the United States never appeared to be interested in institutionalizing a 
special relationship between the two countries over oil, which they blamed on the opposition of 
American oil companies.[4] When it comes to oil, much of Venezuela's foreign policy can be seen 
as an effort to throw off an early dependence of international oil companies and set its own terms 
for the production and export of its key resource. 
The oil wealth generated during the 1970s allowed Venezuela to pursue a more assertive foreign 
policy, and often one that irritated the United States. Its role in the creation and leadership of 
OPEC gave it a new prominence during the oil crises of this period. President Carlos Andres 
Perez (1974-79) promoted a Venezuelan leadership role in the non-aligned movement, often 
critical of U.S. policies, and in 1974, Venezuela reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba.[5] 
Venezuelan support for the overthrow of the regime of dictator Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 
1979 showcased a willingness to actively subvert governments once considered U.S. allies. 
Venezuela also sought to contain and change U.S. Central American policies during the 1980s 
through its leadership role in the Contadora group, promoting confidence building and regional 
peace negotiations as alternatives to a more confrontational U.S. stance with Nicaragua and 
Cuba.[6] Part of the political importance of Venezuela in the region can be explained by its policy 
of strategically subsidizing oil exports to Central America and the Caribbean. Venezuelan 
influence in the region, especially when backed by abundant oil money, occasionally frustrated 
U.S. designs. 
Venezuela’s political leaders after the 1958 transition to democracy were firmly convinced of the 
importance of supporting like-minded governments in the region, and they opposed the model 
advocated by the Cuban revolution on both ideological and pragmatic grounds. The Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations in the United States cooperated assiduously with the Venezuelans in 
defeating a Cuban-backed insurgency in their country. It is from this experience that United 
States and Venezuelan militaries developed strong mutual security and defense links. 
Venezuela’s first leader of the democratic period, Rómulo Betancourt, even promulgated the 
doctrine of non-recognition of both left and right wing dictatorships in the Americas, a step too far 
for the United States, which often saw right wing authoritarian regimes as strategic partners in the 
Cold War.[7] Venezuela had an important role in El Salvador during the 1980s when it provided 
political support to President Duarte's Christian Democratic government. Venezuela also provided 
funding and security assistance to assure the survival of the elected government of Violeta 
Chamorro in Nicaragua following the end of the Sandinista regime in 1990.[8] 
Oil enabled Venezuela to 'punch above its weight' at key moments in its foreign policy history, 
particularly after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises gave it the economic wherewithal to support its 
international agenda. Although occasionally at odds with the United States and other leading 
powers, Venezuela generally pursued a status quo or pro-democracy agenda in the Americas 
designed to promote regional stability. What has changed today is that the foreign policy agenda 
of Venezuela is designed to overturn the status quo, and the oil wealth that made Venezuela 
strategically important has now been devoted to supporting this project. 
What is Different about a Bolivarian Foreign Policy? 
To the extent that it can be defined, President Chávez's Bolivarian foreign policy seeks to defend 
the revolution in Venezuela, promotes a sovereign and autonomous leadership role for 
Venezuela in Latin America, opposes globalization and neoliberal economic policies, and works 
towards the emergence of a multipolar world in which U.S. hegemony is checked.[9] The 
changing pattern of Venezuelan foreign relations since the election of President Chávez, 
particularly its growing closeness to traditional U.S. adversaries, such as Cuba and Iran, and 
potential challengers, such as Russia and China, disturbs many in the United States foreign 
policy establishment. It has also expressed its opposition to the war in Iraq and its skepticism 
regarding the global war on terrorism.  
In concrete terms, President Chávez's first foreign policy goal was revitalizing OPEC, and he has 
succeeded completely, although he did benefit from burgeoning demand for energy in China, 
India and the West. President Chávez has reached out to other OPEC members, even those on 
Washington's short list of least favorite regimes, such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq before the 
overthrow of the Hussein dictatorship.[10] He has also invested a great deal of time in building 
relations with Russia and China, the former because of its important oil production capacity, and 
the latter because it is perceived as a major potential consumer of Venezuelan exports. Beyond 
oil, these two countries are key partners in Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy because they 
represent alternative sources of technology and military equipment whose decisions to cooperate 
with President Chávez are unlikely to be influenced by U.S. objections. The logical objective of 
this policy is to reduce Venezuelan political, economic and military dependence on the United 
States. We should remember that Venezuela will find it difficult to escape its connection to the 
U.S. oil market because the refineries most capable of processing the particular type of sour (high 
sulphur content) and heavy crude produced in Venezuela are almost all located in the United 
States.[11]  
In Latin America, Venezuela has sought to achieve a position of leadership and rally support for 
regional policies and institutions that exclude the United States. One particular area of friction has 
been the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which came to ahead at the 
2005 Summit of the Americas. He also worked towards an alliance of state oil companies in Latin 
America, called Petrosur, to foster stronger regional integration in the energy sector.[12] Similarly, 
at a hemispheric defense ministerial in 2000, the Chávez administration proposed the integration 
of Latin American militaries and the creation of a regional defense alliance without U.S. 
participation.  
These proposals all fit the Bolivarian theme of regional integration and suspicion of the United 
States. The Chávez administration has also dissented from the regional political trend towards 
institutionalizing international policies that defend representative democracy in the region, such 
as the OAS Democratic Charter. Instead, it has showcased its own 'participatory democracy' as a 
superior alternative.[13] In the security arena, Venezuela has suspended all military-to-military 
links with the United States and has sought alternative sources of military expertise and 
equipment from Brazil, China, and Russia. Given the central role that the military plays in 
supporting the Chávez administration in Venezuela, the loss of these military-to-military contacts 
is taken seriously by the United States. Taken together, it is clear that Venezuela seeks to reduce 
its dependence on the United States in security and foreign policy and develop an alternative 
network of allies.[14] 
Having achieved a measure of domestic tranquility in the wake of his victory in the 2004 
referendum on his leadership and his 2005 electoral sweeps in municipal and legislative elections, 
President Chavez is now focusing on communicating his message internationally. As part of an 
effort to increase its regional political and communications reach, the Venezuelan government is 
sponsoring a regional alternative, Telesur, to U.S.-owned media outlets such as CNN. It also 
sees this as an important mechanism to circumvent the role of privately owned Venezuelan 
media companies, which it perceives as actively hostile to the revolution.[15] The Venezuelan 
government has also provided support to sympathizers across the Americas, in the United States, 
and the rest of the developed world, often sponsoring local Círculos Bolivarianos to bring together 
its supporters overseas.[16] Venezuela has also sought to use its oil wealth to purchase influence 
by buying up the international debts of economically troubled regional neighbors such as 
Argentina and Ecuador, and reinvigorating its policy of providing subsidized oil to the Caribbean 
and Central America.[17] 
This has provoked friction with a number of neighboring states due to suspicions that the Chávez 
administration has aided political groups that are either semi-loyal (Bolivia and Peru) or disloyal 
(Colombia) to local democratic regimes. In particular, there are concerns that the boom in oil 
revenues Venezuela is experiencing due to high oil prices in 2004 and 2005 may translate into 
substantial material support for forces opposed to the current democratic order in the politically 
volatile Andean Ridge. 
Venezuelan policy towards Colombia and Cuba are the two areas where U.S. policy makers have 
expressed most concern since President Chávez came to office. In the case of Colombia, 
Venezuela has always had a tense relationship due to enduring border disputes and spillover 
effects of its neighbor's multiple violent insurgencies, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Tensions have worsened since President Chávez has become more vocal in his opposition to 
Plan Colombia. Colombian accusations of Venezuelan material and moral support for the FARC 
have found a sympathetic ear among U.S. policy makers.[18] One of the most salient indications 
of how much relations between the two countries have worsened is the case of the kidnapping of 
FARC leader Rodrigo Granda on Venezuelan territory in 2005. The Colombian government paid 
a reward, allegedly to members of the Venezuela security forces, for the delivery of Rodrigo 
Granda to its territory. This led to weeks of tensions between the two countries and the embargo 
of border trade by Venezuela against Colombia. Mediation efforts by Brazil and other regional 
powers resolved the stand-off, but not before revealing the lack of sympathy in the region for 
Colombia and its ally, the United States.[19] 
During this same time period, Venezuela also entered a de facto alliance with Cuba. Fidel Castro 
serves as an important political ally for President Chávez, and Cuba is a source of technical 
expertise to support the Bolivarian revolution. The influx of Cuban doctors, educators, sports 
trainers, and security experts into Venezuela helps the Chávez administration meet the demands 
of its key constituencies. In particular, Cubans provide politically reliable personnel to staff new 
government poverty alleviation programs. For example, Barrio Adentro places Cuban medical 
personnel in many poor neighborhoods. In return for this assistance, Cuba receives nearly 60,000 
barrels of oil a day, either on very favorable payment terms or as a form of trade in kind.[20] 
Cuban personnel have also been a presence in Venezuela's foreign policy ventures, including at 
the recent Summit of the Americas.[21] There has also been some speculation regarding the 
possible political role that President Chavez might play when Cuba is inevitably faced with the 
passing of Fidel Castro. Given the importance of Cuba to the Venezuelan foreign policy agenda, 
it is hard to imagine that Hugo Chavez would not participate in such a political transition. Given 
the longstanding hostility between Washington and Havana, it is not surprising that the new 
Caracas-Havana alliance has generated suspicions in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. 
What is the bottom line for the United States on Venezuela's Bolivarian 
Revolution?  
In any discussion of contemporary Venezuelan foreign policy, it is important to keep in mind that 
Venezuelan national interests have never been identical with those of developed countries. We 
should expect disagreement even in a relationship historically characterized by the mutual 
interdependence generated by oil. However, it is increasingly clear that when it comes to 
President Chávez's Bolivarian foreign policy, politics trumps economics. Given that President 
Hugo Chávez seems likely to win reelection in 2006, it appears that he will be around to annoy 
Washington for a considerable period of time. This puts the United States in a bind when it comes 
to dealing with the Bolivarian revolution.  
A policy of engagement, which is what the U.S. government attempted in the first two years of the 
Chávez administration, appears unlikely to generate a solid working relationship given the foreign 
policy objectives of Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy. U.S. efforts to work with Venezuela 
since 1998, even on such non-controversial issues as disaster relief, have met with rejection. 
However, there appears to be little sympathy, both in Latin America and internationally, for a 
policy of confrontation with the Venezuelan government. Both international reaction to the 2002 
coup in Venezuela and Latin American reaction to the Venezuela-Colombia crisis over the 
kidnapping of FARC leader Rodrigo Granda confirm this. If Washington pursues such a 
diplomatic policy towards President Hugo Chávez, he has already demonstrated that the likely 
outcome would be the isolation of Washington and its regional allies rather than Venezuela.  
Washington's dilemma does not mean that Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy is likely to 
succeed to any great extent. Venezuela has achieved its minimum foreign policy objective, which 
is the defense of the revolution. However, its leadership role in Latin America is still limited at best, 
and its efforts to construct alternative regional institutions have failed. The fact that only four other 
countries supported the Venezuela position on FTAA at the 2005 Summit of the Americas is an 
indicator that the Chavez agenda has a long way to go before it achieves its objectives. Latin 
American leaders such as Vicente Fox of Mexico and Alejandro Toledo have been vocal in 
criticizing Venezuela's foreign policy and Hugo Chavez's perceived meddling in their domestic 
politics. Venezuela has succeeded in revitalizing OPEC, although worldwide demand for energy 
in the 2000s was likely to provide this opportunity even in the absence of President Chávez's 
leadership. Venezuela's alliance with Cuba serves mostly to strengthen the Chávez 
administration in its own domestic rather than international politics.  
Despite Venezuelan opposition to Plan Colombia, the Colombian state has become stronger and 
better prepared to deal with violent non-state actors within its territory, and the FARC has lost 
ground since President Chávez came to power. Venezuela's new alliances with Russia and 
China are unlikely to produce much in the way of military advantage for this country vis a vis its 
neighbors, particularly if we consider Colombia's growing strength. Even the development of 
alternative markets for Venezuelan oil exports seems difficult to justify on anything other than 
political grounds since the economics of oil so strongly favor a U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship.  
The final question remains whether Venezuela's new political model is likely to be emulated 
across the region. This seems unlikely for two reasons. The first is that the Bolivarian revolution is 
not a coherent ideological model that can be replicated in other countries, but it rather depends 
on the personality, charisma, and drive of President Hugo Chávez. The second is that the 
Bolivarian revolution increasingly depends on distributing large amounts of oil income to serve 
key constituencies in Venezuela. Other Latin American countries would lack this level of 
resources, nor have they shown in the past much success at redistributing wealth.  
However, this does not mean that the underlying sources of political volatility in Latin America—
such as poverty, extreme income inequality, and poor economic policies—will disappear anytime 
soon. This makes it likely that governments will emerge in the region, particularly in the Andean 
region where democracy seems most vulnerable, which sympathize with some elements of the 
new Venezuelan foreign policy, much to the consternation of Washington. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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